Updated for a new generation of lawyers, the second edition features a new chapter on contemporary perspectives on legal reasoning. Written succinctly and in plain English, the engaging subject matter covers indigenous people's customs and rights, fallacies in reasoning, international influences and human rights. For this edition, the book includes a substantial new foreword by leading contemporary legal scholar Frederick Schauer that helpfully places this foundational book into its historical and legal contexts, explaining its continuing value and relevance to understanding the role of analogical reasoning in the law. Levi does just that in a concise manner, providing an intellectual foundation for generations of students as well as general readers. Law isn't a matter of determining what is legal and what is illegal. Originally published in 1949, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning is widely acknowledged as a classic text. It helps students acquire or refine the techniques of close reading, analogizing, distinguishing, positing related fact patterns, and criticizing judicial and legislative exposition and logic.
Third-party sites are multimedia services that allow you to read and download e-books. Referring to both Australian and New Zealand law and the contrasts between them, this book focuses on how lawyers think and reason. It also covers how legal reasoning claims to be distinctive, while following practical reasoning techniques with policy and value elements. Levi does just that in a concise manner, providing an intellectual foundation for generations of students as well as general readers. You should present an 1 overview of the book and 2 discuss the major ideas of legal philosophy or the views or picture of the legal system presented in the work. Yet this change in the rules is the indispensable dynamic quality of law.
In the Mortensen case, a husband and wife who operated a house of prostitution in Grand Island, Nebraska went on vacation in another state, inviting two of the prostitute girls to accompany them. It is not what the prior judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the present judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the determining classification. But reasoning appears to be involved; the conclusion is arrived at through a process and was not immediately apparent. Unlike most legal writings, which are plagued by difficult, virtually incomprehensible language, this book is accessible and clearly written and will help students, professionals, and general readers gain important insight into this well-developed and valuable way of thinking. United states v leon was a federal drug trafficking criminal case in this case the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was changed to allow an exception. Thus it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known rules to diverse facts.
If the framers would have known exactly what they meant, it seems, they would have been less ambiguous. In his analysis he provides a complete and accessible introduction to a vast array of economic terms, concepts, and ideas--making this book a valuable primer for anyone interested in understanding the use of market concepts in legal reasoning. This volume is of interest to students of logic, ethics, and political philosophy, as well as to members of the legal profession and everyone concerned with problems of government and jurisprudence. Students wouldn't pay tens of thousands of dollars in tuition to learn the law and earn their law degrees. Through case examples, illustrative fact patterns, and problems based on hypothetical situations he demonstrates the implications and the ambiguities of law in a market society. Originally published in 1949, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning is widely acknowledged as a classic text.
In this manner the laws come to express the ideas of the community and even when written in general terms, in statute or constitution, are molded for the specific case. This is tantamount to saying that what is required is a different interpretation rather than an amendment. Table of Contents Foreword by Sanford Levinson Preface Chapter 1: What Legal Reasoning Is and Why It Matters Chapter 2: Change and Stability in Legal Reasoning Chapter 3: Common Law Chapter 4: Statutory Interpretation Chapter 5: Interpreting the U. The ambiguity of a constitution does mean that the creation of principles are necessary for interpretation, as with case law. This volume will continue to be of great value to students of logic, ethics, and political philosophy, as well as to members of the legal profession and everyone concerned with problems of government and jurisprudence.
In this way, new rules can be made to replace old, although Levi does not make it clear what leeway a judge has in creating rules that contradict previous decisions that make up the precedent. I'm not suggesting that learning the rules isn't important. Most people come to law school knowing it will be difficult but with no idea why. A cover, contents page, bibliography should not be included. But if learning law were nothing but learning rules, there would be very little to it. But this kind of reasoning is open to the charge that it is classifying things as equal when they are somewhat different, justifying the classification by rules made up as the reasoning or classification proceeds.
The chapters on Statutory Law and Court Opinions have been edited for greater clarity and comprehension. Vandevelde defines this elusive phrase and identifies the techniques involved in thinking like a lawyer. Be sure, the title and author of the book are given at the beginning of the paper. Its language is slightly dry, not to mention stilted by contemporary standards, but it is nonetheless revealing. Based upon how judges interpret each of the elements and then join them together, it is eminently possible for two judges to reach starkly different conclusions even though both may be well-reasoned. We regularly check this is a fully automatic process the availability of servers, the links to which we offer you.
The statement is mere dictum, and this means that the judge in the present case may find irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which prior judges thought important. It is through future cases that such principles are discovered and refined and eventually applied to even later cases. Inevitably, it will be necessary to the understanding of how those rules operate to consider how lawyers and clients, given those rules, act in the real world. A working legal system must therefore be willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the justice of applying a common classification. In his analyses, it becomes evident that legal reasoning is in a distinct class with its own rules, seeking historical consistency while inevitably following social sentiment.
The paper must be typed, double-spaced on letter size paper, and may be no longer than 10 pages nor less than 5 pages. In his classic book, Kenneth J. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, he is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the controlling case. The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process. By presenting these topics through various discussions of cases and examples, it provides students with a solid source to reference for years to come. For this edition, the book includes a substantial new foreword by leading contemporary legal scholar Frederick Schauer that helpfully places this foundational book into its historical and legal contexts, explaining its continuing value and relevance to understanding the role of analogical reasoning in the law. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning , 15 U.
Levi 1911—2000 was attorney general of the United States from 1975 to 1977, president of the University of Chicago, and dean of the University of Chicago Law School. The words used by the legislature or the constitutional convention must come to have new meanings. Perhaps Levi is meaning to stress that while a particular rule might be essential to the decision, the rule remains implicit in the decision and therefore open to future reconstruction—the judge's statement concerning the rule is therefore separate from the rule itself and therefore dictum. Alternatively, Levi could simply be relegating the statement of rule to a lower status than the facts of the case in case comparison. This volume will continue to be of great value to students of logic, ethics, and political philosophy, as well as to members of the legal profession and everyone concerned with problems of government and jurisprudence. A useful new appendix serves as a survival guide for current and prospective law students and describes how to apply the techniques in the book to excel in law school.